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Abstract   In this paper, I consider the relationship between Matthew Kramer’s moral realism 
as a moral doctrine and expressivism, understood as a distinctly non-representationalist metase-
mantics of moral vocabulary. More precisely, I will argue that Kramer is right in stating that moral 
realism as a moral doctrine does not stand in conflict with expressivism. But I will also go further, 
by submitting that advocates of moral realism as a moral doctrine must be expressivists in some 
shape or form. Accordingly, if you do not want to be an expressivist, you cannot defend moral 
realism as a moral doctrine. Similarly, if you want moral realism to compete with expressivism, 
you cannot accept Kramer’s take on moral realism either. Hence, moral realism as a moral doc-
trine stands and falls with expressivism, or so I shall argue. 
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1 Introduction 
When I first read Matthew Kramer’s Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine and the works of 
kindred spirits, I was rather blown away. Could it be that when thinking about metaethical 
issues, such as the existence of moral facts, the possibility of moral knowledge, the action-
guiding character of moral judgements and the meaning of moral concepts, I had been 
thinking about moral issues all along? Kramer (2009: 5) certainly appeared to suggest as 
much when explaining that “there is no fundamental divide between the meta-ethical and 
the ethical. Meta-ethical theses are distinctive in the specific issues that they address, … 
but we should not make the mistake of thinking that their distinctiveness places them 
outside the domain of substantive ethical principles.”  
After a second read, the overall picture looked rather different. This revealed that in 
declaring metaethical positions to be moral doctrines, Kramer (2009: 12) understood 
metaethics as pertaining predominantly to “morality tout court” which, in turn, refers “to 
the whole array of correct ethical/moral standards that truly determine the ethical/moral 
consequences of people’s conduct, and to the diverse categories and properties associated 
with those standards.” Understood as narrowly as this, I was certainly happy to agree 
with Kramer’s moral interpretation of metaethics. Still, two observations puzzled me. 
Firstly, it was obvious that ‘metaethics’ had traditionally been given a much wider reading 
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than one that would limit its remit to morality’s objectivity. That is, rather than being 
exhausted by questions about the existence of moral facts, their nature and knowability, 
investigations into the meaning and function of moral vocabulary, the mental states ex-
pressed by moral judgements and the link between these judgements and motivation, say, 
have also commonly been regarded as classic examples of metaethical enquiry. But if 
Kramer’s moral interpretation of metaethics concerned only theses about morality’s ob-
jectivity, what about the status of these further paradigmatically metaethical enquiries? 
Would Kramer intend that they too must be regarded as moral investigations, or was his 
moral interpretation of metaethics supposed to leave them untouched? The second ob-
servation registered what appeared to be a striking overlap between moral realism as a 
moral doctrine on the one hand and sophisticated expressivism on the other. After all, 
philosophers such as Simon Blackburn (1998) and Allan Gibbard (2003) too have long 
maintained that defending the existence of moral facts, their mind-independence and 
knowability amounts to putting forward moral positions which, as participants of moral 
discourse, they are also happy to endorse. As they also never tire of stressing, though, 
none of this is supposed to stand in any conflict with their expressivism. But if Blackburn, 
Gibbard and Kramer agree on the moral interpretation of theses about morality’s objec-
tivity, how (if at all) do their views differ? 
A third read, this time featuring one of Kramer’s later papers, shed light on both 
sources of puzzlement. In There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism, Kramer distinguishes 
more clearly between Blackburn’s and Gibbard’s expressivism, by which he (2017: 198) 
understands an account of the pragmatics of moral discourse, and what he calls their 
quasi-realism, which he takes to cover the moral defence of morality’s objectivity. Ex-
pressivism, Kramer now clarifies, does not amount to a moral doctrine, but remains to be 
understood as a non-moral, philosophical position. More precisely: 
[I]f the field of meta-ethics is understood more expansively than I have construed it 
when I have proclaimed that all meta-ethical doctrines are substantive ethical doctrines 
[namely, as pertaining only to propositions about the existence, nature or objectivity 
of moral principles and properties], and specifically if that field is understood to in-
clude endeavors such as Blackburnian expressivism, then those endeavors should con-
tinue as they have unfolded hitherto (Kramer 2017: 208). 
In contrast, quasi-realism as Kramer understands it just is moral realism as a moral doc-
trine, or so he (2017: 204) asserts: “That is, it affirms the objectivity of morality in several 
different senses, and it does so entirely on moral grounds.” Accordingly, since quasi-
realism is realism as a moral doctrine, and since quasi-realism is fully compatible with 
expressivism, expressivist endeavours “are entirely consistent with moral realism as a 
moral doctrine, and they complement it nicely” (Kramer 2017: 208). 
Again, this changed the overall picture significantly. When first reading about moral 
realism as a moral doctrine I, like many others, had conceived of it as aiming to add a new 
position to the metaethical landscape that would offer an alternative to the existing 
metaethical accounts of metaphysically substantive moral realism and expressivism. After 
all, Kramer and like-minded philosophers appeared to spend considerable time opposing 
not only any metaphysically substantive approach to moral discourse, but also 
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expressivism and its distinctive theses about moral judgement.1 Now I understood that 
moral realism as a moral doctrine did not even seek to address the same questions as 
expressivism. Far from standing in competition with it, then, moral realism as a moral 
doctrine was to be ‘complemented nicely’ by expressivism. 
But if so, what exactly is the relationship between moral realism as a moral doctrine 
and expressivism? And in which way, if any, does moral realism as a moral doctrine add 
new considerations to metaethical debate, or any other debate for that matter? Providing 
responses to both questions will be the objective of this paper. When doing so, I will 
argue that Kramer is right in stating that moral realism as a moral doctrine does not stand 
in conflict with expressivism. But I will also go further, by submitting that advocates of 
moral realism as a moral doctrine must be expressivists in some shape or form. I will 
suggest that moral realism as a moral doctrine does have new arguments to offer, but 
that these arguments neither pertain to metaethical enquiries as undertaken by expressiv-
ism and metaphysically substantive moral realism, nor to substantive first-order ethics as 
traditionally pursued by utilitarians and Kantians, say. Indeed, I will argue that moral 
realism as a moral doctrine cannot offer any arguments in the context of metaethical en-
quiries as tackled by expressivism, such that moral realism would disappear from this 
field of research altogether if Kramer’s take on moral realism were correct and that of 
metaphysically substantive realists were wrong. Accordingly, if you do not want to be an 
expressivist, you cannot defend moral realism as a moral doctrine. Similarly, if you want 
moral realism to be a metaethical competitor of expressivism’s, you cannot accept Kra-
mer’s take on moral realism either. Moral realism as a moral doctrine stands and falls with 
expressivism, or so I shall argue. 
In what follows, I will concur with many of Kramer’s points. With regard to others, 
I will confess to uncertainty about whether or not Kramer and I are in agreement. And 
concerning others, I will simply disagree. As such, I will start in §2 by specifying how I 
understand expressivism and moral realism as a moral doctrine. Whilst I will predomi-
nantly follow Kramer’s description of the latter, I will disagree with him about the for-
mer’s characterisation by suggesting that expressivism should not be located within prag-
matics, but metasemantics. The term ‘quasi-realism’, in turn, I will abandon altogether. 
How moral realism as a moral doctrine relates to metasemantic projects and why it needs 
to be combined with expressivism will then be explained in §3. Discussion of what fol-
lows from this result for the development and success of moral realism as a moral doc-
trine and the new insights it can offer rounds off the paper in §4. 
Importantly, the conclusions I will draw are not limited to Kramer’s specific take on 
moral realism as a moral doctrine. Rather, they apply to all forms of moral realism which 
defend a minimalist, discourse-internal approach to moral facts and properties.2 To pay 
                                               
1 See Kramer (2009: ch. 8), Dworkin (1996: 108-112, 2011: ch. 3), Scanlon (2014: ch. 3), Parfit 
(2011: ch. 28).  
2 As such, this includes the positions of Nagel (1986), Scanlon (2014), Parfit (2011) and 
Dworkin (1996, 2011). For metaphysically substantive realism, see Brink (1989), Shafer-Landau 
(2003) and Enoch (2011) and Wedgwood (2007). What I will call ‘minimalist’ moral realism also 
goes under the heading of relaxed realism, quietism, or even anti-realist cognitivism. 
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heed to this observation—and since ‘moral realism as a moral doctrine’ is, after all, quite 
a bit of a mouthful—I will from now on refer to this family of approaches as ‘minimalist 
moral realism’. 
2 Expressivism and minimalist moral realism 
Let me begin, then, by explicating how I understand the two protagonists of this paper, 
minimalist moral realism and expressivism. Since I believe that employment of these two 
notions enables us to express everything that we want to say in this debate, I will drop 
‘quasi-realism’ as a notion altogether. The term ‘quasi’ has been the source of many mis-
understandings in the past; hence, there is no need to invite further unnecessary confu-
sion by employing it in this paper. 
Minimalist moral realism, in turn, will be taken to be characterised by its endorse-
ment of two central theses. Firstly, it holds that questions pertaining to the existence of 
moral facts and properties, their nature and knowability do not concern non-moral, dis-
course-external queries, but moral, discourse-internal matters. As such, it adamantly re-
jects substantively metaphysical approaches to moral discourse which seek to examine 
the existence of moral truths and facts, their nature and knowability by appealing to gen-
eral metaphysical criteria such as causal efficacy, explanatory potency or deliberative in-
dispensability, say. Rather, all propositions about morality’s objectivity are moral them-
selves, or so minimalist moral realists submit: They do not amount to propositions which 
we bring forth from outside moral discourse about the moral domain, but to moral prop-
ositions which are to be defended from within moral discourse on grounds of moral 
arguments. 
As Kramer (2017) rightly indicates, adopting minimalist conceptions of truth, refer-
ence, fact, representation and properties plays a crucial role in this moral interpretation 
of morality’s objectivity, and it is not hard to see why.3 For, if facts are no more than true 
statements, as minimalists maintain, and if assigning truth to a statement is conceptually 
equivalent to asserting this very statement, then holding there to be a moral fact that lying 
to the electorate is wrong simply amounts to making the moral assertion that lying to the 
electorate is wrong. Similarly, if properties are the shadows of predicates, then all it takes 
for the moral property of wrongness to exist is that a moral claim featuring the predicate 
‘wrong’ is true. And if all that is required for a statement purportedly to represent some 
moral fact is for it to have assertoric form and ascribe a moral predicate to some object, 
moral statements are clearly representational. As such, minimalism removes any meta-
physical overtones from notions such as truth, fact, representation or property by regard-
ing them not as metaphysically heavyweight concepts, but as useful devices that we 
                                               
3 Things are not quite as simple as I make out here, as I explain in Tiefensee (forthcoming). 
Still, as far as I am aware, all minimalist moral realists adopt minimalism about truth in some 
shape or form. For instance, see Scanlon (2014: 43), Parfit (2011: 756, n. 295), Kramer (2009: 
261). Dworkin’s (2011: 173) position is somewhat less clear, although his take on truth might still 
be categorised as non-representationalist.  
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employ in language to do certain things that would not be possible without them. Conse-
quently, applying these notions in moral contexts also enables us to do something within 
moral discourse, rather than taking us outside it by leading us to metaphysically substan-
tive spheres. Unsurprisingly then, minimalism about semantic notions is the natural bed-
fellow of minimalist moral realism.  
However, minimalist moral realists do not simply assert that propositions about mo-
rality’s objectivity are moral. Rather, as part of their second thesis, they also endorse and 
defend specific propositions about moral objectivity. As such, they declare that there are 
moral facts and properties, that these facts and properties are mind-independent, that we 
have epistemic access to them and do indeed have knowledge about certain moral facts, 
that (most) moral questions receive determinately correct moral answers, that we can err 
about which moral answers are correct, and so on. Accordingly, whereas minimalist 
moral realism’s first thesis concerns the categorisation of propositions about moral ob-
jectivity as moral, its second component targets the actual vindication of moral objectivity 
from within moral discourse. 
Note that thus defined, moral realism’s defence of morality’s objectivity concerns 
predominantly moral metaphysics and moral epistemology. Kramer (2017: 204), in turn, 
would also want to add semantics to this list. Without arguing this point here, let me 
merely register my disagreement: Whilst certain aspects of moral terms’ semantics—such 
as fixing the specific extension of ‘right’, say—do indeed concern moral matters, others—
including the truth-aptitude and purportedly representational character of moral sen-
tences—do not.4 Whenever I speak of morality’s objectivity, I will, therefore, predomi-
nantly have moral metaphysics and moral epistemology in mind. 
                                               
4 To provide no more than the slightest of hints about the reasons for my disagreement, let 
us start with truth-aptitude, which Kramer locates within the moral domain. Indeed, he (2017: 
205) not only agrees with Dworkin that “the question whether moral judgments can be true or 
false is a substantive moral issue, not a distinct meta-ethical one’’, but also believes this position 
to be “uncontroversial” and that “Blackburn would certainly agree with [it].” I disagree and, I 
believe, so would Blackburn. Firstly, the truth-aptitude of moral statements—together with their 
assertoric, representational, descriptive character—is to be explained by metasemantics, not by 
moral theorising. That is, Blackburn’s thoughts about the use and function of moral terms do not 
merely “[alert us] to the fact that the semantics of such discourse are (minimalistically) objective 
along the lines expounded by quasi-realism”, as Kramer’s (2017: 204, fn. 16) puts it, but provide 
a metasemantic explanation of this descriptive, assertoric character of moral sentences. Accord-
ingly, when asked how it comes about that moral sentences have assertoric form and can be 
ascribed truth-values, Blackburn would not provide a moral response; rather, he would explain 
that moral sentences have this form because otherwise they could not realise their practical func-
tion. On the one hand, Kramer (2017: 204, fn. 16) appears to acknowledge as much when ex-
plaining that “[w]ere the semantics not objective in that fashion, moral discourse could not fulfill 
its central functions.” On the other hand, I must admit that I struggle to square this acknowl-
edgement with his moral interpretation of truth-aptitude. To offer a cautious diagnosis of this 
seeming mismatch, my hunch is that by locating expressivism within pragmatics, Kramer attrib-
utes to expressivism a more detached relationship with semantics than my metasemantic inter-
pretation of expressivism would allow. 
Turning away from the categorisation of truth-aptitude, it also appears implausible to hold 
that all components of semantics are moral. To use a particularly clear example, take a quick look 
at the semantics of ‘ought’. Spelling out the general truth-conditions of ought-claims along the 
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Turning to our second protagonist in the guise of expressivism, then, three observa-
tions are particularly significant. The first concerns expressivism’s general characterisa-
tion. Above, I have already hinted that contrary to traditional understandings, Kramer 
(2017: 200) suggests that expressivism should not be interpreted as providing a semantics 
of moral sentences, but as presenting an account of the pragmatics of moral discourse: 
“That is, instead of aiming to supply an exposition of what moral utterances mean, ex-
pressivism should be aiming to supply an exposition of what people do by engaging in 
such utterances and by articulating them in propositional forms. It should be endeavoring 
to chart what people achieve at practical levels by suffusing their interactions with moral 
judgments.” 
I agree that expressivism should not be understood as a semantic theory. However, 
although considerations about what moral vocabulary allows us to do play a key role in 
expressivist thinking, it should not be located within the field of pragmatics either. For, 
expressivism does not take the meaning of moral assertoric sentences as given and then 
considers how these sentences are used within our practices. Rather, it examines the use 
of moral utterances in our practices in order to explain what constitutes their meaning on the 
basis of these examinations.5 In short, expressivism is best understood as a metasemantic 
theory, which explains in virtue of what it is that moral sentences possess their specific 
meanings.6 As such, it does not suspend judgement on what constitutes meaning. Nor 
does it aim to attribute literal meanings to expressions, specify the referents of singular 
terms or make claims about a predicate’s extension. Rather, it explains why expressions 
have these meanings, why names have their specific referents and why predicates have 
their particular extensions.7  
                                               
lines of Kratzer-style (1981) deontic semantics is not a moral exercise; indeed, it is widely regarded 
to be a boon of this semantics that it provides the same general semantic formula across moral and 
non-moral uses of deontic operators such as ‘ought’. Importantly, this does not mean that moral 
considerations are irrelevant for this semantic project. However, they enter the scene only when 
determining the truth-value of specific moral ought-sentences, namely by examining which moral 
ordering source is the correct one to plug into the general Kratzer-style semantic formula. 
5 Again, I am not entirely sure if Kramer would disagree with this characterisation. On the 
one hand, some of Kramer’s explanations sound as if he (2017: 204, fn. 16) came at least close 
to acknowledging an interpretation along these metasemantic lines. On the other, this metase-
mantic characterisation entails consequences which Kramer seemingly wants to reject. Firstly, 
these include implications for our understanding of moral sentences’ truth-aptitude and purport-
edly representational character as explained in footnote 4. Secondly and relatedly, they concern 
expressivism’s quest for internal adequacy as explained below. Accordingly, I suspend judgement 
on whether or not Kramer would agree both with this metasemantic interpretation and the 
thoughts on internal adequacy as spelt out shortly. 
6 This interpretation is quickly spreading. As a small sample, see Chrisman (2016, 2017), Köh-
ler (2018), Ridge (2014), Schroeter/Schroeter (2018, 2019), Tiefensee (2019). For semantic inter-
pretations of expressivism, see Rosen (1998), Schroeder (2008) and Wedgwood (2007). 
7 Although metasemantic accounts do not answer semantic questions, they have to explain 
what makes it the case that sentences can be modelled along the lines of a specific semantic 
theory. Pace Kramer (2017: 199-200), this also means that placing expressivism outside of seman-
tics does not eschew problems associated with the Frege-Geach problem once and for all, but 
relocates them to another level. For both points, see Schroeter/Schroeter (2019: 13). 
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What makes expressivism distinctive, in turn, is how it sets out to answer these ques-
tions. That is, in contrast to metasemantic representationalism, it does not seek to explain 
the meaning of moral expressions such as ‘good’ or ‘morally ought’ in terms of what 
these expressions represent in the world, say by specifying that ‘good’ means GOOD be-
cause it stands in a representational relation to goodness, whereas ‘morally ought’ obtains 
its meaning by representing some worldly ought-relation. Rather, expressivism pursues a 
distinctively non-representationalist approach, according to which these expressions have 
their specific meanings not because of what they represent, but because of how they are 
used. For instance, ideationalist expressivists, such as Blackburn (1998) and Gibbard 
(2003), will hold that moral sentences have their meanings in virtue of the mental states 
that these sentences are used to express, where these mental states are non-representa-
tional and motivational. In contrast, inferentialist expressivists, such as Brandom (1994) 
and Chrisman (2016), will suggest that moral sentences obtain their meanings by fulfilling 
a specific metaconceptual role within the game of giving and asking for reasons, which 
consists in making inferential relations explicit that would otherwise remain implicit in 
this game. Although my alliances lie with the latter, which of these expressivist accounts 
to adopt will not be important for my purposes. What will be important is, rather, that 
all expressivist accounts are forms of metasemantic non-representationalism, in that they 
all eschew appeal to notions such as representation, truth or reference when spelling out 
what constitutes moral terms’ meaning. Hence, whenever I speak of expressivism, I will 
use this term widely by taking it to encompass all accounts that share this non-represen-
tationalist approach to moral vocabulary. 
This metasemantic characterisation also straightforwardly leads to our second ob-
servation about expressivism. As I have remarked in the introduction, expressivists agree 
with minimalist moral realists that questions pertaining to morality’s objectivity concern 
moral matters. However, they do not merely endorse this moral interpretation of moral-
ity’s objectivity; rather, they also provide its theoretical foundation. 
To elaborate, as I said earlier, minimalist moral realism’s moral interpretation of 
moral objectivity crucially relies on minimalism about semantic notions, according to 
which the key to concepts such as ‘true’ or ‘refers’ does not lie in any metaphysical con-
siderations about the property of truth or some metaphysically robust reference relation, 
but in what these concepts allow us to do within our language and practices. As many 
will have noted, though, this is exactly the answer an expressivist would give when asked 
about the meaning of ‘true’, ‘refers’, ‘represents’ and other semantic notions. Put differ-
ently, then, just as expressivism explains the meaning of moral notions in terms of the 
function that they assume within our language and practices, it also explains the meaning 
of semantic notions such as ‘true’ and ‘representation’ on the basis of their respective 
functions. Consequently, by providing a metasemantic analysis of semantic notions, ex-
pressivism delivers exactly that minimalist, non-representationalist account of truth, fact 
and representation which is pivotal in explaining why theses about moral metaphysics 
and epistemology are discourse-internal, moral claims. Metasemantic expressivism, then, 
embeds both minimalism and the moral interpretation of moral objectivity within the 
wider theoretical framework of non-representationalism.  
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The third and final observation notes that Kramer is right in stating that expressivism 
is not in the semantic business of fixing the extension of moral predicates such ‘good’, 
‘ought’, ‘desirable’ or ‘virtuous’, and nor does it determine the particular truth-values of 
the sentences in which these words feature. Similarly, it is true that it is not one of ex-
pressivism’s objectives to defend minimalist moral realism’s second thesis, and thus the 
existence of mind-independent moral facts and their knowability. However, understand-
ing expressivism as a metasemantic theory entails that expressivism is in the business of 
explaining not only how it comes about that moral expressions have the extensions that 
they have, but also on which basis truth-values can be ascribed to moral sentences and 
in which way these sentences can be said to be purportedly representational. Likewise, 
one of expressivism’s key objectives is to achieve internal adequacy, such that expressiv-
ism’s metasemantic position can be shown to have adequate resources to account for 
everything that features within moral practice (Gibbard 2003: 186). Since according to 
expressivism, propositions about moral truths and facts are discourse-internal, attaining 
internal adequacy thus also requires expressivism to account for moral truth and fact talk, 
claims about moral properties’ mind-independence, propositions about moral knowledge 
and other theses about morality’s objectivity. 
As such, expressivism neither entails nor endorses the claim that there are moral 
truths. Rather, it restricts itself to explaining, say, that someone evaluating as true that 
lying to the electorate is morally wrong expresses disapproval towards lying to the elec-
torate. Similarly, expressivism neither entails nor endorses the mind-independence of 
moral properties. Instead, it does not go beyond explaining, for instance, that anybody 
defending the mind-independence of moral properties expresses disapproval of a certain 
dispositional set-up and approval of an alternative one. Nor does expressivism entail or 
endorse the possibility of moral knowledge. All it does is to explain, for example, that 
anybody attributing moral knowledge to someone else attributes both commitment and 
entitlement to some moral proposition and is committed to this proposition herself. Ac-
cordingly, qua expressivists Blackburn, Gibbard, Chrisman or Brandom do not seek to 
vindicate the existence of moral truths and properties, their mind-independence or know-
ability. Rather, they only ever aim to vindicate internal features of moral practice by ex-
plaining what is involved in putting forward such claims about morality’s objectivity, 
whilst doing so on a fully non-representationalist basis. 
Which immediate conclusions follow from these observations about our two pro-
tagonists? Firstly, we can see that minimalist moral realism is only partly a moral doctrine. 
More precisely, whilst its second, distinctly realist thesis about moral metaphysics and 
epistemology is indeed moral, its first thesis concerning the moral interpretation of moral 
objectivity, is not. Rather, since this first thesis depends (at least in part) on minimalism 
about semantic notions, and since minimalism is not to be supported on moral grounds 
but by metasemantic and logical arguments, minimalist moral realism crucially relies on 
non-moral considerations. Indeed, it is this theme of minimalist moral realism’s non-
moral commitments which will continue to occupy us for the remainder of this paper.  
Secondly, we find that whilst expressivism is compatible with moral realism—char-
acterised by its defence of moral properties’ existence—it is just as compatible with an 
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error-theoretic stance that rejects their existence. Similarly, it is compatible with moral 
properties’ mind-independence and knowability as defended by moral realists, just as it 
is compatible with their mind-dependence as championed by constructivists and epis-
temic inaccessibility as suggested by the sceptic. Accordingly, expressivists can, but need 
not be minimalist moral realists. Whether or not they are is an open, distinct question that 
depends on which moral positions they seek to defend, not as expressivists but as partici-
pants of moral practice. 
In his more recent work, Kramer has already hinted that minimalist moral realists 
can also be expressivists: expressivism, he states, complements minimalist moral realism 
nicely. We have already seen one aspect of this compatibility here, in that by adopting 
minimalism about truth, facts, reference and representation, minimalist moral realists im-
plicitly rely on expressivism about semantic notions. Next, I will make the stronger claim 
that minimalist moral realists must be expressivists and must be so not only about seman-
tic notions, but also moral vocabulary. To see why, though, I first need to say a few more 
words about minimalist moral realism’s general relationship to metasemantic enquiries 
into moral vocabulary. 
3 Minimalist moral realism and metasemantics 
So far, I have distinguished between two separate kinds of endeavours: firstly, the non-
moral, metasemantic project of accounting for the meaning of expressions including se-
mantic notions and moral terms such that internal adequacy is achieved and, secondly, 
the moral project of establishing morality’s objectivity. Minimalist moral realism is clearly 
involved in this second project. By suggesting that minimalist moral realists must be ex-
pressivists, I seem to presume that they must also be engaged in the first endeavour. But 
must they? 
You might think that our answer should be negative. After all, what makes minimal-
ist moral realism minimalist is its opposition to metaphysical enquiries into moral dis-
course, holding instead that questions about morality’s objectivity concern moral, and 
not substantively metaphysical matters. Accordingly, it might be argued that just as min-
imalist moral realists reject substantively metaphysical investigations into moral discourse, 
they should also reject any metasemantic studies about moral vocabulary. Hence, when 
asked how it comes that moral words acquire their respective meanings, minimalist moral 
realists should simply refuse to offer a response and declare instead that these are not 
questions that they, or anybody else for that matter, should engage in. 
I find this strategy utterly unconvincing. For, whilst I am very sympathetic to the 
view that nothing metaphysically interesting can be said about morality’s objectivity, there 
must be something informative that we can say about why ‘good’ means GOOD, rather 
than RIGHT, TREE or BIG, say. After all, meanings are not brute facts, nor does ‘good’ 
receive its meaning ‘by magic’, as Wedgwood (2007: 19) puts it. Accordingly, refusing to 
engage with metasemantic questions, denying their significance or adopting quietism 
about meaning, is not a convincing strategy for anybody to adopt. Rather, minimalist 
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moral realists—just like anybody else—must be able to say something about the meaning 
of moral vocabulary, where this ‘something’ must obviously be such that it does not 
conflict with anything else they would want to proclaim about moral metaphysics, moral 
epistemology and the objectivity of morality.8 
Kramer appears to agree. For instance, when discussing Wedgwood’s (2007: 19) dec-
laration that it would seem to him “incredible that it could be an absolutely unanalysable 
feature of a particular thought or statement that it is about one thing rather than another”, 
Kramer (2017: 209-210) does not push back by denying that such metasemantic magic 
would be incredible, but by pointing out that it would be wrong to assume that minimalist 
moral realism is committed to quietism about meaning. Similarly, in response to Jamie 
Dreier’s (2004: 35) challenge to fill in the blank in (G): 
(E)  Edith said that abortion is wrong. 
(G)  Its being the case that (E) consists of nothing more than ____, 
Kramer (2017: 2010) declares: 
Dreier chidingly refers to ‘lazy theorists [who] might just try [to fill in the blank by] 
more or less repeating (E).’ Filling in the blank by largely repeating E would of course 
be correct, but no proponent of moral realism as a moral doctrine has to rest content 
with that stark approach. Equally apt as a way of filling in the blank would be ‘Edith’s 
having ascribed to the act-type of abortion the basic moral status that is conferred or 
would be conferred on that act-type by any moral principle that prohibits abortion.’ 
This latter way of filling in the blank is more controversial than the E-repeating ap-
proach—it would need to be defended (on moral grounds) against devotees of moral 
particularism, for example—but a proponent of moral realism as a moral doctrine can 
happily adopt it. 
Again, then, Kramer appears to accept Dreier’s challenge whilst rejecting the claim that 
minimalist moral realists have nothing informative to say about how to fill in the blank 
in (G). Still, whilst it should be clear that I regard Kramer as right in picking up Dreier’s 
gauntlet, I also believe that he provides the wrong kind of response to his challenge.  
To elaborate, the most plausible reading of Wedgwood’s and Dreier’s thoughts is to 
interpret them as posing—you will have guessed it—a metasemantic challenge.9 That is, 
just as Wedgwood asks us to explain what makes it the case that a particular thought is about 
one thing rather than another, Dreier asks us to explain what makes it the case that the 
sentence uttered by Edith means one thing rather than another. However, Kramer’s re-
sponse:  
(K)  Its being the case that Edith said that abortion is wrong consists of nothing more 
than Edith’s having ascribed to the act-type of abortion the basic moral status that 
                                               
8 Compare Schroeter/Schroeter’s (2019: 194) “generalized integration challenge” at this point, 
i.e. the “task of providing, for a given area, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics, epistemol-
ogy and metasemantics, and showing them to be so.” 
9 For more on this interpretation, see Simpson (2018) and Dreier (2018). 
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is conferred or would be conferred on that act-type by any moral principle that 
prohibits abortion.  
does not address this question. Firstly, noting that Edith ascribes the moral status of 
wrongness to abortion correctly describes Edith’s statement, but does not tell us in virtue 
of what it is that the term ‘wrong’ means WRONG and refers to wrongness. Secondly, 
explaining the meaning of ‘wrong’ by appeal to other expressions, such as ‘being prohib-
ited by a moral principle’, might engage in the project of explicating the meaning of 
‘wrong’, but does not provide a metasemantic explanation of how ‘wrong’ obtains this 
meaning. To be absolutely clear, then, there is nothing wrong with (K) as such. Still, as a 
response to Dreier’s challenge, it misses the point. 
How, then, should Kramer and other minimalist moral realists respond instead? 
Here, two alternatives are conceivable. Firstly, they could seek to develop a novel, distinctly 
minimalist-realist metasemantics of moral vocabulary and thus provide a response which 
is neither expressivist nor one that a metaphysically substantive moral realist might want 
to give. In this case, minimalist moral realists would plant their own, new flag within the 
non-moral, metasemantic landscape and enter into genuine competition both with the 
metasemantic theory defended by expressivists and that of metaphysically substantive 
moral realists. Secondly, they could fall back on established metasemantic responses that 
other metaethical accounts have already developed. If so, minimalist moral realism would 
not add to the metasemantic debate, nor compete with the metasemantics suggested by 
others. Rather, minimalist moral realists would simply adopt whatever metasemantics is 
on offer that suits its moral defence of moral objectivity best. Which alternative is it going 
to be, then? I have already laid my cards on the table: I believe not only that minimalist 
moral realists should combine their account with an established metasemantic position, 
but that they cannot help but do so. And this established account will inevitably be expres-
sivism’s non-representationalism. 
To see why, let us return to our distinction between the two metasemantic schools 
introduced above, namely representationalism and non-representationalism. Representa-
tionalists, we have said, explain the meaning of an expression on the basis of the relation 
that this expression bears to what it is about. For instance (and oversimplifying greatly), 
the term ‘tree’ means TREE because our use of this term is causally regulated by trees; 
‘bicycle’ and ‘clock’ have different meanings because they stand for different objects in 
the world; in order to find out what ‘good’ means, we must discover to which property 
this term refers, etc. Non-representationalists, we have specified in turn, reject this order 
of explanation. That is, rather than asking what a term stands for, they submit that we 
need to ask which role it plays in our language and practices in order to find out about 
its meaning. As such, ‘true’ means what it does not because it refers to the property of 
truth, but because of its logical functions in language; ‘good’ obtains its meaning not 
because of its representation of goodness, but because it allows us to express certain 
motivational states, say; ‘tree’ means TREE not because it stands in a metaphysically ro-
bust refence relation to trees, but because of what the use of ‘tree’ commits and entitles 
us to infer within the game of giving and asking for reasons, say, where this includes, but 
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is not exhausted by considerations about our causal reactions to trees. Crucially, as these 
examples show, non-representationalism does not imply that all vocabularies fulfil the 
same function—far from it. Still, whichever role they play, it is this role which explains 
their meaning.  
These two schools of representationalism and non-representationalism are generally 
taken to exhaust the metasemantic spectrum. Accordingly, minimalist moral realists must 
join one of them. Due to their own metaphysically lightweight commitments about moral 
properties, this cannot be metasemantic representationalism.  
To see why, note that by explaining meaning in terms of notions such as truth, ref-
erence and representation, representationalism requires that these semantic notions 
shoulder explanatory weight within our account of meaning. Minimalist conceptions of 
these notions, though, cannot perform such an explanatory role. Since the minimalist 
truth-schema ‘‘S’ is true iff p’ presupposes that we know what ‘S’ means, this schema 
cannot be used to explain ‘S’’s meaning. Similarly, if properties are the shadows of pred-
icates, we first need an understanding of the latter before we can make any judgements 
about the former. And if reference is not understood as a robust relation between words 
and the world, but is abstracted from meaning assignments so as to make sentences come 
out as true, reference assignments cannot precede meaning assignments, but must follow 
them. 
In a nutshell, then, by requiring semantic notions to feature in explanations of mean-
ing, representationalism presupposes substantive conceptions of truth, reference and 
properties. Yet, we said earlier that minimalist moral realists reject any such substantive 
interpretations by being minimalists about truth, reference and properties. Accordingly, 
minimalist moral realists cannot be representationalists about moral vocabulary. Instead, 
they must join expressivists in being metasemantic non-representationalists. 
Still, you might think that this does not quite settle the matter of minimalist moral 
realists’ metasemantic position. After all, as I have indicated above, non-representation-
alists never tire of stressing that different vocabularies fulfil different functions, in that 
the notion ‘tree’, for instance, plays a very different role within our language and practices 
than the term ‘true’, say. Moreover, I have hinted that when spelling out the conceptual 
role of ‘tree’, we must take into account our disposition to react to trees, whereas we need 
not include any disposition to react to the property of truth when specifying the logical 
function of ‘true’. Accordingly, could we not declare, within non-representationalism, that 
those vocabularies which work like ‘tree’ fulfil a specifically representational function, 
whereas those which function more like ‘true’ fulfil a non-representational role? And 
could we not use this distinction to drive a wedge between minimalist moral realism and 
expressivism, in that minimalist moral realists could assimilate the function of moral 
terms such as ‘good’ to that of ‘tree’, whereas expressivists would declare that ‘good’ 
functions more like ‘true’, all within general metasemantic non-representationalism?  
The answer to the first question is ‘Yes’. That to the second, though, is ‘No’. More 
precisely, we can indeed introduce within the general approach of non-representational-
ism the distinction between representational and non-representational vocabularies as 
suggested here. However, minimalist moral realists cannot attribute a representational 
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function to moral vocabulary. Again, it is their commitment to minimalism which ex-
plains why. For, note that on a minimalist reading, all assertions are representational—
mathematical assertions truly or falsely represent what mathematical reality is like, just as 
empirical and moral assertions truly or falsely represent what the natural and moral 
worlds are like respectively. Accordingly, minimalist representation cannot sort assertoric 
sentences into those which fulfil a representational function and those that function non-
representationally. Rather, if having a representational function is to help us in distin-
guishing between vocabularies that perform this function and those that do not, ‘repre-
sentation’ must be given a more substantive reading than minimalism about representa-
tion allows.10 What exactly this substantive sense of representation involves need not 
concern us here.11 Rather, it is sufficient to point out that by presupposing some substan-
tive conception of representation, ascribing a representational function to moral vocab-
ulary is incompatible with minimalist moral realism, which rejects any such substantive 
interpretation of moral representation. Accordingly, even if we introduce within non-
representationalism the distinction between representational and non-representational 
vocabularies—as I believe we should—minimalist moral realists must join expressivists 
in ascribing a non-representational function to moral vocabulary.  
Accordingly, we have now reached the point where we can see that expressivism not 
only complements minimalist moral realism, but also that minimalist moral realists must be 
expressivists, not only about semantic notions but also moral vocabulary: Whilst they 
cannot withdraw to quietism about meaning due to quietism’s general implausibility, they 
cannot adopt metasemantic representationalism or ascribe a representational function to 
moral vocabulary due to their own minimalist commitments about moral discourse. Ac-
cordingly, minimalist moral realists have no choice but to join the expressivist camp of 
non-representationalism.  
4 What minimalist moral realism is and what it is not 
What follows for minimalist moral realism, then? 
Firstly, even if we have now established that minimalist moral realists must be ex-
pressivists, this does not settle which kind of expressivism they should accept. Its best-
known version is certainly ideationalist expressivism, according to which the meaning of 
utterances is explained by appeal to the mental states they express, whilst moral 
                                               
10 Compare Chrisman (2016: 204, fn. 1) on this point, who explains that “a sentence carries 
descriptive content just in case its use to make an assertion carries direct inferential consequences 
about the way reality is. (Roughly, it has to imply that reality is matched by its truth condition, 
whatever theses happen to be.)”, where this ‘matching’ must be more substantive “than the de-
flationary way of a predicate being true of [an object].”  
11 For instance, it might be fleshed out in terms of causal relations between us and what we 
describe (Brink 1989), appeal to natural selection (Sinclair 2006), a substantive sense of property 
which constrains the conceptual role of corresponding predicates (Wedgwood 2007), deliberative 
indispensability (Enoch 2011), specific explanations of success (Boyd 1989), language entry tran-
sitions (Tiefensee 2016), or some other substantive account of description and representation. 
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utterances are taken to express motivational mental states (Blackburn 1998, Gibbard 
2003, Ridge 2014). As I have hinted earlier, though, I believe that minimalist moral real-
ists are better advised to adopt inferentialist expressivism instead (Brandom 1994, Chris-
man 2016).12 Why? Remember that minimalist moral realists need to supplement their 
account with a metasemantics which bests suits their take on moral objectivity. Remem-
ber also that this metasemantics needs to achieve internal adequacy, such that it can ade-
quately account for all features that are internal to moral practice, including minimalist 
moral realists’ claims about morality’s objectivity. Without arguing this point here, I be-
lieve that inferentialist expressivism has the edge over ideationalist expressivism in this 
respect: As it does not focus on any motivational mental states that moral utterances 
allegedly express, but on the metaconceptual role played by moral vocabulary, inferen-
tialist expressivism promises to offer a more direct route to internal adequacy and prop-
ositions about morality’s objectivity than ideationalist expressivism.13 
Of course, adopting inferentialist expressivism does not imply that minimalist moral 
realists need to accept everything inferentialist expressivists say about moral vocabulary, 
nor that they would be barred from making new suggestions as to how this inferentialist 
take on moral vocabulary could be expanded and improved.14 And of course, whenever 
they do so, they will need to make sure that their suggestions achieve the best possible 
fit with their specific take on the objectivity of morality. Still, when developing these 
suggestions, they will not do so qua moral realists, and thus as defenders of moral objec-
tivity, but as non-moral metasemanticists whose aim it is to provide the best non-moral 
account of moral language. Indeed, they cannot do so qua moral realists: Minimalist moral 
properties, minimalist moral facts and minimalist moral representation, I have argued above, 
cannot play any explanatory role within our account of meaning. Accordingly, if mini-
malist moral realists’ take on moral objectivity were indeed correct, moral truths, facts 
and properties could no longer offer any metasemantic linchpins; rather they would 
simply drop out of our metasemantic story altogether. 
This, in turn, has two important implications. Firstly, observing that the minimalist 
take on moral objectivity necessitates a non-representationalist metasemantics entails that 
the success of minimalist moral realism depends on the success of expressivism. More 
precisely, if expressivism failed to achieve internal adequacy—that is, if it could not suc-
cessfully account for those propositions about moral objectivity that minimalist moral 
realists seek to defend within moral discourse—minimalist moral realists could no longer 
defend both the objectivity of morality and its minimalist interpretation, but would have 
                                               
12 This is not to say that these versions exhaust the expressivist spectrum. Rather, there are 
arguably also conceptual role accounts of expressivism which are not inferentialist (Köhler Ms.). 
13 For instance, inferentialist expressivism might be better placed to eschew Frege-Geach-like 
problems, questions about the cognitivist categorisation of moral discourse and potentially tricky 
follow-up questions about the content of the mental states expressed by moral utterances which 
is supposed to explain their meaning. For more on this, see Tiefensee (Ms.). Needless to say, this 
is not to imply that inferentialist expressivism comes without problems itself. 
14 For instance, I (Ms.) try to do so when presenting a new inferentialist account of evaluative 
moral notions that seeks to supplement inferentialists’ dominant focus on deontic operators such 
as ‘ought’ with a theory about notions such as ‘good’.  
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to choose between them: Either, they could continue to defend morality’s objectivity, but 
would now have to adopt representationalism and thus a substantive approach to moral 
facts and properties that can successfully account for propositions about morality’s ob-
jectivity. Or they could cling on to expressivism and minimalist interpretations of theses 
about moral truths and properties, but would now have to declare that these are not 
objective. Either way, then, if you believe that expressivism does indeed fail to be inter-
nally adequate, you cannot be a minimalist moral realist.  
Secondly, these considerations show that you cannot be both a minimalist moral real-
ist and hold moral realism to stand in conflict with expressivism. Rather, you once more 
face a clear choice: Either, you continue to hold that the minimalist take on moral objec-
tivity is correct, but must accept that moral realism does not compete with expressivism. 
Or you have the strong intuition that moral realism and expressivism do indeed stand in 
conflict with one another, but must now accept a representationalist account of moral 
vocabulary which presupposes substantive understandings of moral facts and proper-
ties.15 Accordingly, if you do indeed want moral realism to present an alternative to 
metasemantic expressivism, and if you do want moral facts and properties to play a role 
within metasemantics, you cannot be a minimalist moral realist. Qua realists, minimalist 
moral realists simply have nothing to contribute to this metasemantic debate.  
But if so, can they offer anything new to any other debate? Yes. For, although they 
cannot, qua moral realists, contribute to metasemantics and although I do not believe that 
they seek to contribute to first-order ethical debate as pursued by utilitarians and Kanti-
ans, say, minimalist moral realist can present novel and interesting arguments exactly 
about those abstract questions regarding moral objectivity which, as Kramer (2009: 11) 
repeatedly stresses, are still part of moral discourse. That is, minimalist moral realists 
should not be required to present novel metasemantic accounts of meaning. Nor do they 
develop answers to concrete moral questions, such as ‘Is it morally permissible to break 
someone’s confidence?’, ‘Are all equal resource distributions just?’, or ‘Did David act 
morally recklessly?’. Instead, they present new responses to abstract moral questions such 
as ‘Are there determinately correct answers to moral problems?’, ‘Are moral truths mind-
independent and if so, in which way?’, or ‘Can our moral beliefs be false when we are in 
a state of ideal rational reflection?’. Importantly, given their degree of abstraction, an-
swering these questions requires different arguments from providing responses to con-
crete moral queries. For instance, when asked about moral determinacy, we cannot simply 
respond that it is true that breaking Emma’s confidence is permissible because it would 
prevent great harm. Instead, we have to explain on moral grounds why it is true that ‘Either, 
breaking Emma’s confidence is permissible or it is not permissible’ holds.16 Importantly, 
providing such moral answers to abstract moral questions is far from straightforward. 
                                               
15 Whilst certain metaphysically substantive moral realists clearly opt for metasemantic repre-
sentationalism (Brink 1989, Boyd 1988), the assessment of other substantive realist accounts, 
such as Wedgwood’s (2007) conceptual role account, is a little trickier. The way I understand him, 
though, Wedgwood combines this conceptual role account with a substantive account of truth. 
I ignore these complexities here. 
16 For more on this, see Tiefensee (forthcoming). 
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Accordingly, it is with regard to such abstract, moral arguments about moral objectivity, 
that I believe minimalist moral realism shines. 
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